The goal of this paper is to compare the similarities and differences between Bayesian and belief function reasoning. Our main conclusion is that although there are obvious differences in semantics, representations, the rules for combining and marginalizing representations, there are many similarities. We claim that the two calculi have roughly the same expressive power. Each calculus has its own semantics that allow us to construct models suited for these semantics.
Introduction
Bayesian probability theory and the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of belief functions are two distinct calculi for modeling and reasoning with knowledge about propositions in uncertain domains. Bayesian networks and Dempster-Shafer belief networks both provide graphical and numerical representations of uncertainty. While these calculi have important differences, their underlying structures have many significant similarities. In this paper, we investigate the similarities and the differences between the two calculi.
A Bayesian network is a probability model consisting of a directed acyclic graph representing conditional independence assumptions in the joint distribution [Spiegelhalter et al. Appeared in: Information Systems Frontiers, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dec. 2003 , pp. 345-358. 1993 . A D-S belief network graphically describes knowledge and the relationships among variables using the so-called Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. Numerically, a Bayesian network consists of a factorization of a joint probability distribution into a set of conditional distributions, one for each variable in the network. A D-S belief network assigns D-S belief functions or basic probability assignments (bpa's) to subsets of the variables in the domain of each relation. Likelihood functions can be used to update a Bayesian network, while additional evidence entered as bpa's is used to update the D-S belief network. Similarities of Bayesian and D-S belief networks and their underlying calculi have been noted previously. The theory of belief functions captures Bayesian probability models as a special case, so any Bayesian network model can be replicated exactly in a D-S belief network model [Zarley et al. 1988] . Similarly, any D-S belief network model can be approximated by a corresponding Bayesian network model [Shafer 1986 ]. Shafer and Srivastava [1990] argue that the belief-function calculus is a generalization of the Bayesian probability calculus and show that any Bayesian model of uncertainty is also a belief function model. They make a case for using the belief function calculus in the context of auditing due to its greater flexibility, but emphasize that using belief functions does not eliminate the possibility of later using the advantages of propagation associated with Bayesian reasoning.
According to their conclusions, belief functions allow non-statistical evidence to be modeled in a way that legitimately represents the underlying knowledge base.
Our basic thesis is that Bayesian and D-S reasoning have "roughly" the same expressive power. We say roughly since we do not have an exact metric to measure the expressiveness of an uncertainty calculus. The two calculi have different semantics. However, given a model in one calculus, it is possible to transform the model to the other and achieve the same qualitative results. Confirming this thesis will allow these two calculi to be further integrated in decisionmaking applications. In a related paper [Cobb and Shenoy 2003 ], we examine methods for transforming a belief function model to an equivalent probability model. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the representation, semantics and process of making inferences in a Bayesian network. In Section 3, D-S belief network representations of uncertainty and their semantics are reviewed. Section 4 compares and contrasts important facets of Bayesian and D-S belief networks. Finally, Section 5 contains a summary and some conclusions.
Bayesian Networks
Representation. Bayesian networks model knowledge about propositions in uncertain domains using graphical and numerical representations [Spiegelhalter et al. 1993] . At the qualitative level, a Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph where nodes represent variables and the graph represents conditional independence relations among the variables, in a sense to be described shortly. At the numerical level, a Bayesian network consists of a factorization of a joint probability distribution into a set of conditional distributions, one for each variable in the network. Additional knowledge in the form of likelihood functions can be used to update the joint probability distribution.
Each variable in the network has a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possible values that comprise its state space. If there is a directed arc from variable X to variable Y, we say X is a parent of Y and Y is a child of X. Based on expert knowledge or empirical observations, a set of conditional probability distributions is specified for each variable, one for each configuration of states of the variable's parents.
Semantics. Figure 2 .1 shows a Bayesian network for a hypothetical anti-air threat identification problem. The graph representing probabilistic relationships among the nodes reveals the conditional independence relations assumed in the network. Each variable in the network has a set of parents. The parents of each node are listed in Table 2 Threat Effective? (TE) ML_Indicator (ML) EO_Sensor (EO)
Consider an ordering of the variables such that the variables at the tail of directed arcs precede variables at the heads of the directed arcs. Since the directed graph is acyclic, such an ordering always exists. One such ordering in the example network of Figure 2 .1 is T R E TM G V ML EO RWR TE. Each variable in a Bayesian network is implicitly assumed to be conditionally independent of its predecessors in the ordering, given its parents. Table 2 .2 summarizes a minimal set of conditional independence relations assumed in the Bayesian network of Figure   2 .1. In summary, missing arcs from a variable to its successors in the ordering imply conditional independence assumptions in the joint probability distribution represented by the Bayesian network. Combination in a Bayesian network involves "pointwise" multiplication of probability functions. Suppose P s is a probability function for s and P t is a probability function for t. Then P s ⊗P t is a probability function for s ∪ t defined as follows: , is a probability function for s\{A} defined as follows:
Here, the symbol '\' denotes set-theoretic subtraction, i.e., s\r denote the set of all elements of s that are not in r.
Inference. The conditional probability functions (or conditionals, in short) specified in In the example of Figure 2 .1, given the number of states in the state space of the variables, the joint distribution will have 7 4 · 2 4 · 3 2 = 345,744 states. Determining the marginal probability of each variable from the joint distribution is conceptually simple, but computationally expensive. Fortunately, methods for calculating the marginal probabilities of variables of interest using local computation-without explicitly computing the joint distribution-are available [Pearl 1986 , Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter 1988 , Jensen et al. 1990 , Shenoy and Shafer 1990 . Software is readily available for automating the process of inference Suppose the following information becomes available:
(1) The true state of Threat Effectiveness (TE) = Y. The posterior distribution provides updated information about the probabilities of each state of the Threat (T) variable. Prior to adding the new information to the network, each state of T had a probability of occurrence of 1/7. The posterior distribution reveals that the states {SA-8} and {SA-9} are slightly less likely than the other five states.
The type of inference where marginal probabilities for variables of interest are updated is referred to as sum propagation. Another type of inference-max propagation-finds the configuration of states of variables that has the maximum probability, i.e., a mode of the joint distribution.
Bayesian networks use conditional probability functions as their numerical inputs.
Dempster-Shafer (D-S) belief networks are graphical representations that use D-S belief
functions or basic probability assignments as their numerical inputs. These are described in the next section.
3.
Dempster - The valuation network (VN) graph defined by Shenoy [1992] can be used to construct a D-S belief network. This is done for the hypothetical anti-air threat identification problem in Rectangles represent evidence. In Figure 3 .1, evidence is available regarding variables R and V.
The arcs connecting valuations to variables are typically undirected; however if a bpa m for a set of variables, say h∪t, is a "conditional" for some, say h, given the rest t, then this is indicated by making the edges between m and the variables in h directed. Suppose m is a bpa for h∪t. We say m is a conditional for h given t if m ↓t is a vacuous bpa, i.e., m ↓t (Ω t ) = 1. In the D-S network shown in Figure 3 .1, since this network models the same knowledge as described in the Bayes net of Figure 2 .1, most of the valuations representing the knowledge of the domain are conditionals. Thus, e.g., the bpa m T-E is a conditional for E given T. In the valuation network 
Assuming the joint bpa can be determined in this way equates to assuming a set of conditional independence relations in the joint bpa [Shenoy 1994 ]. These conditional independence assumptions are encoded in the structure of the valuation network graph, as opposed to the numerical details of the bpa's. Figure 3 .1: r = {T, R, E}, s = {V}, and t = {G}. All paths from a node in r to a node in s includes variable G. Therefore, r and s are conditionally independent given t. Notice that each variable, given its neighbors, is independent of all remaining variables. Table 3 .1 all such conditional independence assumptions in the network of D-S belief network models are created using two-part construction. First, the structure of the belief network is formed using one of two methods. An expert's causal knowledge can be used to assess conditional independence relations by determining "direct causes"; this method is similar to that used in constructing a Bayesian network. Alternatively, conditional independence relations can be directly assessed using the no double-counting interpretation. 
To illustrate the no double-counting interpretation of conditional independence, consider two variables Threat (T) and Emitter (E) in the D-S belief network described previously with the joint distribution P T, E . Probability theory defines the factorization of the joint distribution as:
P T, E = P T ⊗P E|T where P T = P T, E ↓Τ and P E|T = P T, E /P T . Thus, it is okay to combine P T and P E|T since it will always give the correct joint function P T, E . In the illustration, P T encodes information about T, but P E|T encodes nothing about T because P E|T has the property that P E|T ↓T is vacuous. Thus, there is no double counting of information about T in the combination of P T and P E|T .
Suppose now that P T, E is constructed by combining P T with P E . Consider P E that is computed from P T, E as follows: P E = P T, E ↓E . In general, P T, E ≠ P T ⊗P E . Thus P T and P E are not independent with respect to P T, E . Notice that P E = P T, E ↓E = [P T ⊗P E|T ] ↓E . Since P E contains information about T, in combining P T and P E , information about P T is double-counted and therefore this product will clearly not yield the correct joint distribution P T, E . There are two cases where P T and P E are independent with respect to P T, E . First, if P T = P T ⊗P T , then P T, E = P T ⊗P E . In this case, although there is double counting of P T , this is of no consequence because P T is idempotent. Second, suppose that the values of P E|T don't depend on T, i.e., P E|T (e i , t j ) = P E|T (e i , t k ) for all e i ∈ Ω E , and all t j , t k ∈ Ω T . In this case, it is easy to show that P E|T (e i , t j ) = P E (e i ) for all t j ∈ Ω T , and consequently,
In the process of marginalizing P T ⊗P E to E, information in P T is completely removed. Therefore P E ⊗P T = P T, E and there is no double counting.
The model developed in Figure 3 .1 for the hypothetical anti-air threat identification problem will be correct if there is no double-counting of uncertain information in the joint bpa: 
for all nonempty c ⊆ Ω x∪y , where K is a normalization constant given by
The un-normalized joint bpa for x∪y is given by
for all nonempty c ⊆ Ω x∪y .
Clearly, if the normalization constant is equal to zero, the combination is not defined, so the two bpa's are termed not combinable. If the bpa's m X and m Y are based on independent bodies of evidence, then m X ⊕m Y represents the result of pooling these bodies of evidence. Shafer [1976] shows that Dempster's Rule is commutative and associative, so the bpa's representing the evidence in the network of Figure 3 .1, for instance, could be combined in any order to yield the joint bpa.
Marginalization. Like marginalization for probability functions, marginalization for bpa is obtained by addition. Suppose m is a bpa for s, and suppose A ∈ s. The marginal of m for s\{A}, denoted by m ↓(s\{A}) , is the bpa for s\{A} defined as follows:
for all nonempty subsets a of Ω s\{A} . Suppose weak evidence exists that the Threat (T) is in the subset, a = {t 1 , t 2 , t 5 , t 6 , t 7 }. This evidence about the Threat (T) is introduced into the network through another bpa:
These two bpa's are combined using Dempster's Rule resulting in the joint bpa m T-E ⊕m Τ described as follows:
1 ),(t 2 ,e 2 ),(t 5 ,e 4 ),(t 5 ,e 5 ),(t 6 ,e 6 ),(t 7 ,e 7 )}) = 0.3
1 ),(t 2 ,e 2 ),(t 3 ,e 3 ),(t 4 ,e 3 ),(t 5 ,e 4 ),(t 5 ,e 5 ),(t 6 ,e 6 ),(t 7 , e 7 )}) = 0.7
The resulting combination can be marginalized to the Threat (T) variable as follows:
A useful way to summarize the information contained in the resulting bpa is to calculate the corresponding plausibility function. The plausibility function corresponding to a bpa m T is defined as a function Pl:
In this case, it may be useful to focus on the singleton elements of Threat (T) to determine which are now considered most likely. Plausibilities are calculated as follows, with the rightmost column representing the normalized plausibility calculated by dividing the plausibility of each element by the sum of all the plausibilities: 
A Comparison
The previous two sections have described the representation and semantics of Bayesian networks Bayesian network model construction involves assessing conditional independence relations by considering "direct causes" and "irrelevance" as criteria, whereas construction of a D-S belief network model involves assessing conditional independence relations using semantics of "no double-counting." At the numerical level, a Bayesian network is composed of a factorization of a joint probability distribution for the variables in the network that can be used to specify prior marginal probabilities for each variable. In a D-S belief network, bpa's are specified for each valuation and can be used to calculate a joint bpa for the variables in the network, provided there is no double-counting of evidence.
The differing numerical representations in Bayesian networks and D-S belief networks each have relative advantages and weaknesses. Conditional probabilities are easy to use for representing causal knowledge, but can be difficult and non-intuitive to use for associational, logical, and other types of non-causal knowledge. On the other hand, bpa's are not intuitive to use for capturing causal knowledge, but are much easier to use for capturing evidence. Updating of knowledge in Bayesian networks is accomplished by using likelihoods, whereas updating of knowledge in D-S belief networks is performed by specifying evidence as bpa's.
As an example of the differences in numerical representation of causal knowledge using
Bayesian and D-S belief networks, consider a domain with two variables: Cancer (C) and
Smoking (S). The state space of S is comprised of two propositions: s = a person is a smoker and ~s = a person is a non-smoker; C is defined similarly for cancer. The knowledge that smoking causes cancer can be encoded in conditional probabilities by assigning a higher probability to the presence of cancer given that a person smokes and a relatively lower probability to cancer given that a person does not smoke. For instance, based on expert knowledge or historical data, a conditional probability representation, P, is specified as:
The probability of having cancer given that a person does not smoke is 0.10, but this probability increases to 0.40 given that a person smokes.
Smets [1978] (see also [Shafer 1982 , Smets 1993a ) defines an operation, called the ballooning extension, for creating a bpa from a conditional probability representation for models consisting of a finite number of conditions, each based on independent empirical data. Using the above conditional representation P, the following bpa assignments are created: The bpa, m, has the following properties:
(1) m ↓s is vacuous.
The ballooning extension representation of conditional probability distribution described above is only one method of several others that also satisfy the three conditions stated above.
Other methods for constructing belief functions from conditional probability distributions have been described by Black and Laskey [1990] , Dubois and Prade [1986] , and Srivastava [1997] .
To illustrate the representation of non-causal knowledge using both Bayesian and D-S numerical representations, consider the example of visibility (V) and guidance (G) of anti-air threats from the anti-air threat identification problem. A conditional representation requires creating a dummy variable (TE) whose parents are V and G, then instantiating TE = y, and expressing the constraint between V and G in P(TE = y | V, G). The conditional representation for each combination of states of V and G is defined in Table 4 .1. A bpa for the valuation V-G in the D-S belief network is as follows: (Hi, EO) , (Me, R) , (Me,EO) , (Lo, R) m 
To model this evidence as a likelihood function, we assign a likelihood for each state that is proportional to the plausibility of that state:
These likelihoods can then be entered into the Bayesian network in the usual inference process.
The likelihoods should be based on evidence alone so that there is no double counting of knowledge already represented in the Bayesian network.
We conclude this section by discussing an example used by Bogler [1987] to claim that belief functions are superior to probability theory. However, we show that if the belief function model is transformed to a probability model correctly (by using the so-called plausibility transformation [Cobb and Shenoy 2003] , then the two calculi give identical conclusions. 
The ratio of the plausibilities of states {SA-4} and {SA-6} are:
Suppose a Bayesian probability model has an equally likely prior probability distribution, P, for the seven states of the Threat ID (T) variable:
The weak evidence that the threat is an SA-4 missile is converted from the bpa representation to an un-normalized probability function using the plausibility transformation method [Cobb and Shenoy 2003 ], which yields the un-normalized probability function as follows:
The evidence that the missile is definitely a SAM is modeled using a second likelihood function:
The prior probability distribution, P, and the two likelihood functions, L 1 and L 2 , can then be combined and normalized to create a posterior probability distribution, P':
The ratio of the probabilities of states {SA-4} and {SA-6} are: Proponents of the Dempster-Shafer's theory of belief functions claim that the D-S theory is more expressive than probability theory since it can distinguish between vacuous knowledge (represented by a vacuous belief function) and knowledge that all states of a variable are equally likely (represented by a Bayesian belief function in which all focal elements are singleton subsets with the same probability mass). When such belief functions are converted to equivalent probability functions, they both reduce to an equally likely probability distribution. From a descriptive point of view, Ellsberg [1961] argues that human decision makers react quite differently to the two different situations. From a normative point of view (e.g. Savage [1950] ), the two situations have no significant differences for making decisions. We note, however, that there is no coherent decision theory for the Dempster-Shafer's theory that can take advantage of this expressiveness. The decision theory proposed by Jaffray [1989] and Strat [1990] requires the choice of an ad-hoc parameter that in essence reduces an expectation with respect to a belief function to an expectation with respect to a probability function. The decision theory proposed by Kennes and Smets [1994] reduces a belief function to a probability function prior to making decisions using Bayesian decision theory. Neither decision theory is able to exploit the so-called expressiveness of belief functions in representing ignorance.
Conclusions and Summary
The main goal of this paper is to compare two seemingly disparate calculi for uncertain reasoning. While there are many differences, there are also many commonalities. Our main conclusion is that the two calculi have roughly the same expressive power. The reason we need these calculi is that they have different semantics and if our knowledge of the domain fits a particular semantic, then we should use the appropriate calculus to build a model in that domain.
This does not mean that other calculi cannot represent the knowledge in the domain. An analogy is having a toolbox with many tools. If one has a nail, use a hammer. If one has a screw, use a screwdriver. We can drive a screw with a hammer, but the results may not be so elegant. We are skeptical of claims such as one tool is sufficient for all jobs or that one tool is superior to another.
Thus, e.g., we should not be restricted to using just one calculus. We should be more concerned with the models we build using these calculi. The theory of belief functions provides us with some semantics for building models. If these semantics are appropriate for the domain we are trying to model, we should model the domain using belief functions.
The thesis that the theories of belief functions and probability have roughly the same expressive power suggests that one can translate a belief function model to an equivalent probability model. This topic is explored in detail in Cobb and Shenoy [2003] .
